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Abstract 
 
As the impacts and potential of climate change are realized at the governance level, states are moving towards 
adaptation strategies that include greater regulatory restrictions on development within coastal zones.  The purpose 
of this paper is to outline the impacts of existing and planned regulatory mechanisms on the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, which prevents the government taking of private property for public use without just 
compensation.  A short history of regulatory takings is explained, and the potential legal issues surrounding 
mitigation and adaptation measures for coastal communities are discussed.  The goal is to gain an understanding of 
the legal issues that must be resolved by governments to effectively deal with regulatory takings claims as coastal 
mitigation and adaptation plans are implemented. 
 
A Short History of Regulatory Takings 
 
“…[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” (U.S. Const. amend. V).  The 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from government acts that directly interfere 
with private rights attached to real property.  If a taking is proven, the government action is valid only when two 
criteria are met.  First, the government must prove the taking of private property was done for a public purpose.  
Second, in addition to showing a public purpose, the government must also provide just compensation to the private 
landowner.  Just compensation is generally based on the fair market value of the property at the time the government 
takes the property. 
 
Now that we have a basic summary of the Fifth Amendment conditions to a government taking of private property, 
it is important to quickly summarize the competing dynamics involved in the government regulation of land.  These 
competing interests derive mainly from government’s power to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of its’ 
citizens (found primarily under the 10th Amendment to the United States Constitution); and the limits to this 
government power as it related to real property based on the Fifth Amendment conditions of public use and just 
compensation mentioned above. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has aided our understanding of when a taking of private real property occurs.  Some 
instances are obvious, such as where the government intentionally takes private property pursuant to its eminent 
domain power.  In other instances, the potential taking is less obvious because the government is not overtly acting 
pursuant to its eminent domain power, but rather restraining the use of private land through a regulation.  A main 
inquiry in these so-called regulatory types of takings is whether the government regulation has gone so far as to 
result in a per se, or categorical taking of the property.   
 
There are two major categories of per se regulatory takings.  The first category is when a government regulation 
results in a permanent physical occupation of the private land (Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 
U.S. 419 (1982)), such as a government regulation that allows for a private cable box to be permanently attached to 
private real property.  The second category, based in the Lucas decision, occurs when the government regulation 
removes all viable economic use of the private land.  For example, a government regulation permanently preventing 
development on land previously capable of being developed may result in the removal of all viable economic use of 
the property.   
 
A number of factors are balanced in determining when all viable economic use of the land has been removed, some 
of which focus on the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the landowner prior to the regulation (Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).  The Lucas per se regulatory takings analysis 
may be viewed as a balance between the government’s Tenth Amendment rights to protect its citizenry, and the 
private citizen’s Fifth Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable government intrusion. 
 
 Categorizing the individual property right at stake becomes important when looking at regulatory takings from the 
point of view of balancing the Tenth and Fifth Amendments.  For instance, a close examination of the individual 
property right being burdened can aid in identifying the obligations, if any, which may be owed by the government.  
Critical questions for examination include: whether the private landowner actually owns the property right at stake; 
whether the alleged property right can be categorized as a public nuisance; and, whether there are background 
principles of law that preclude a takings claim.  The purpose of these inquires is to ensure the government regulation 
actually interferes with a discernable property right.  If it does not, then there can be no regulatory taking.  The 
reminder of this article focuses on this background principle inquiry, and then explores how such an analysis is a 
necessary first step when determining the effect of government mitigation and adaptation efforts within coastal 
areas. 
 
Existing and Planned Regulatory Mechanisms 
 
It should come as no surprise that governments at the federal, state, and local levels are actively pursuing climate 
mitigation and adaptation strategies that potentially limit land use.  As governments pursue these policies, their 
impact on the Fifth Amendment must be considered.  It seems governments have two choices when planning for 
complete prohibitions on the development of land: they can either purchase littoral landowner rights through a direct 
eminent domain proceeding, as there can be little argument climate adaptation and mitigation strategies are in the 
public interest; or they can regulate land within coastal regions.  The term regulation is assumed to include long-
term prohibitions on the development of property in coastal regions, rather than conditions to development, such as 
rolling easements.  If governments choose to regulate coastal activities, by far the cheaper and politically prudent 
alternative,- then regulatory takings claims will likely follow.    
 
To aid in properly analyzing the extent of government liability for climate adaptation and mitigation strategies in 
coastal regions, governments should engage in a preliminary analysis of the nature of the regulation itself, and then 
compare this analysis with the actual property rights and expectations of existing landowners.  For example, where 
the government regulation is intended to protect against a traditional public nuisance, then it is far less likely that a 
regulatory takings claim will prevail because the landowner never had the right to engage in such an activity in the 
first place.  However, as Professor Huffman points out, the claim of public nuisance cannot be a judicial construct; it 
must be based in the common law traditional itself.  Fundamentally, this means the government regulation must do 
no more than formalize a pre-existing nuisance, which the landowner was always barred from engaging in.   
 
In the context of climate change, it remains to be seen how regulations supporting mitigation and adaptation 
strategies might be protected from background principles analysis.  For instance, in the Lucas case, Justice Scalia 
identified a number of principles in which states can avoid a takings claim.  In doing so, he offered examples where 
background principles of law, or an otherwise close analysis of the state power, would prevent a regulatory takings 
claim.  In one principle, Scalia notes a state can prevent harmful or noxious uses of property without requiring 
compensation.  The key is that such a regulation by the state must provide a significant and well-established public 
benefit, while being generally applicable to all similarly situated properties.   
 
The second principle identified in the Lucas decision is a qualifier of the first.  It suggests a regulation avoids a 
takings claim only where it is shown that the property rights being denied by the regulation were never part of the 
landowner’s title to begin with.  For climate regulation purposes, this qualifier suggests that while states can purport 
to justify a regulation based on background principles, they cannot do so where the regulation takes away a right of 
ownership that was part of the landowner’s estate when they received title to the property.  For example, if a 
landowner bought a property that included a general right to use the property for X number of uses, but the 
government regulation changes the use to X minus 2, then the regulation has taken away a right of ownership that 
existed when the landowner purchased the property.  It seems any climate-related restrictions must sufficiently link 
historical principles of police powers (via public nuisance) as the basis from which the regulation is being 
implemented.   
 
The third principle identified in the Lucas decision highlights pre-existing property rights, such as the navigation 
servitude, which are superior to the property rights of an individual landowner.  For instance, the rights of a riparian 
landowner are subject to the navigation rights of the government.  A private landowner takes ownership subject to 
this superior right.  Another example is the Public Trust Doctrine, which subjects the rights of littoral or riparian 
 landowners to certain rights of the public in navigable waters.  The key element is a pre-existing government right 
established in property law, which limits the extent of property rights obtainable by the private landowner. 
 
Discussion 
 
It is not immediately clear how to ensure climate change regulations steer clear of regulatory takings claims, 
especially where those regulations entirely prohibit development.  Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) provides an example of how a temporary moratorium on 
development may survive a regulatory takings claim, but its application to climate change regulation is suspect 
because sea-level rise is not generally seen as a temporary condition in human timeframes.  However, there are a 
few lessons that can be learned from the Lucas decision, and specifically the background principles discussion.  
First, to avoid a regulatory taking claim, climate change regulations should focus their purpose on preventing private 
land activities that were always prohibited, simply making the implicit prohibition explicit through the regulation.  
To do this, some care should be taken at the outset to properly identify the exact purpose of the regulation, including 
specifically identifying the types of land uses being proscribed.  This will help policymakers understand the actual 
purpose of the regulation, and also assess the potential impacts on private citizens and constitutionally protected 
property rights. 
 
Second, it is critical to identify how climate change necessitates the explicit regulation of private property in new 
ways.  Attention should be placed on how climate change evokes a change in circumstances, or the way in which we 
have traditionally approached coastal development.  For instance, we have always known the coast to be a dynamic 
place, but climate change fundamentally alters our traditional understanding of limits on the intensity and frequency 
of the assumed dynamic nature of coastal areas.  As a result, new regulations reflect the new dangers posed to the 
community, and these new dangers are similar in kind to those that have traditionally been regulated by government 
as public nuisances.  For example, in Lucas, Scalia notes how changed information – a nuclear power plant is found 
to exist on land with an active fault line – can alter the expectations of what activities are allowed on certain 
property. 
 
Finally, there should be a clear indication that the climate change regulation has spawned from fundamental changes 
in community values.  As Professor Huffman rightly identifies, common law is not a judicial construct, but rather a 
reflection of the rules a community chooses regarding social existence.  Since common law tradition supports a 
background principles claim, climate change regulations that impact local land use should ensure the basis for the 
regulation is supported by community choice.  This way, the connection between the climate regulation and 
common law principles is clearly established.   
 
Conclusion 
 
If predictions of climate change impacts – such as sea-level rise – come to pass, public policy will demand more 
proactive regulations, including limiting the development of land in coastal regions.  These regulations will 
undoubtedly be challenged as regulatory takings.  Lessons from the Lucas case can aid in avoiding such claims.  
Specifically, regulations that are developed in-line with background principles of law will more readily avoid 
regulatory takings claims.  However, to do this, there are a number of principles that should be employed by policy 
drafters.  The key to successful regulations lie in the nexus developed between climate change policy and traditional 
public safety measures, especially where regulations employ complete prohibitions on coastal development.  
Because this nexus must be proven on a regulation-by-regulation basis, the ultimate effectiveness of climate change 
regulations removing all viable economic use of land remains to be seen. 
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